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Battered by the System: 
How Advocates Against Domestic Violence Have 
Improved Victims' Access to Child Support and 
TANF 
Naomi Stern-
I figured if they was to pursue child support from him, he really 
would come at me in a violent way. I know him like a book. He's 
just looking for a reason. He was just waiting for a reason to come 
at me in some kind of way. He even threatened to kill me and bury 
me on the side of my sister. So I take things like that serious .... I 
just told her [the caseworker] I didn't want them pursuing child 
support. 
- Patsy, TANF recipient l 
I don't want anything from him. . .. I don't want his money. I 
just want him to leave me and my children the hell alone. 
- Bonnie, a domestic violence shelter resident-
Sometimes the system starts to take on the face of my batterer. 
- Sylvia, a domestic violence shelter residenr 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The threat of poverty presents a formidable barrier for many low-
• A.B., Harvard University 1997; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center 2002. Many 
thanks to my parents, who supported me throughout my education. Special thanks go to 
Professor Deborah Epstein for supervising this project and also to Patricia Loomis, Anne 
Menard, Jody Raphael, Susana SaCouto, Sharon Santilli, Kiersten Stewart, and Vicki 
Turetsky for their helpful research suggestions or comments. The viewpoints and any errors 
are my own. 
l. Quoted in Laura Lein et ai., With the Best of Intentions: Family Violence Option and 
Abused Women's Needs, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 193,204 (2001). 
2. Quoted in Maria L. Imperial, Self-Sufficiency and Safety: Welfare Reformfor Victims 
of Domestic Violence, 5 GBO. 1. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 20 (1997). 
3. Quoted in id. at 23. 
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income women who are seeking to leave their abusive partners. Within this 
group of women, women who are mothers often worry that they will not be 
able to support themselves and their children without the financial help of 
their children's father. Among women who are able to work outside their 
homes, many are not able to make enough money in their jobs to keep them 
and their children out of poverty or homelessness.4 In a domestic violence 
survivor's transition to economic independence and self-sufficiency, child 
support payments and welfare payments in the form of Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) often playa major role.5 Yet 
access to both child support and T ANF can be perilous for women who are 
experiencing or have experienced domestic violence at the hands of their 
children's father, as testimony from the above women illustrates. 
For low-income women and their children who are survivors of 
domestic violence, the political and legal landscapt: at the federal level 
worsened with the enactment in 1996 of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Welfare Act).6 In addition to 
tightening work requirements for welfare recipients and permitting states to 
set lifetime limits on an individual's ability to receive welfare assistance, 
the Welfare Act increased penalties for mothers who fail to cooperate with 
states' efforts to obtain child support payments from their children's father. 
As described in greater detail below, if mothers do not cooperate with their 
state, they and their families may not be eligible for TANF or may face 
sanctions from the state. 
For victims of domestic violence who do cooperate, this threshold 
requirement for T ANF benefits means - in effect that many victims face 
financial or legal retaliation from their abusers. 7 In the context of a 
relationship where abuse has been present, this retaliation may take the 
4. In addition to anecdotal evidence available from multiple domestic . legal services 
providers in D.C. and throughout the country, see, for example, BARBARA EHRENREICH, 
NICKEL AND DIMEO: ON (NOT) GETTING By IN AMERICA 11-49 (2001) (describing 
Ehrenreich's recent economic 'experience of low-wage waitressing and housekeeping in 
Florida, as well as that of her co-workers); Mary Ann Dutton et ai., Characteristics of Help-
Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs of Battered immigrant Latinas: Legal and 
Policy implicatiOns, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 245 (2000) (illustrating that the 
median income for employed immigrant women in Washington, D.C. was less than $9,000 
per year in 1992). Nearly all homeless women have experienced severe physical violence or 
sexual assault during their lifetimes according to research conducted in one state. See 
Martha F. Davis, The Economics of Abuse: How Violence Perpetuates Women's Poverty, in 
BATTERED WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM: THE TiES THAT BIND 17,25 (Ruth 
Brandwein ed., 1999) (citing E.L. Bassuk et ai., Single Mothers and Welfare, 275 SCI. AM. 
60, 60-67 (1996), which found a violence rate of 92% for homeless women in 
Massachusetts). 
5. See Davis, supra note 4; at 17-18 (noting cases of women who relied on public 
assistance during their escape from their batterers). 
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2003). 
7. For a more detailed discussion of these dynamics in the context of child support, see 
infra notes 28-45 and accompanying text. 
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form of renewed violence against the victim, legal complaints for custody 
of children in common, or legal requests for modification of previously 
court-ordered custody or visitation.8 Because of a batterer's desire to 
control his former partner, his contact with her in a courtroom setting could 
result in renewed violence against her. Paradoxically, therefore, many low-
income victims of domestic violence who are leaving or who have already 
left their abusers often must choose between poverty and increased 
violence for themselves and their children at their abusers' hands. 
Two exemptions exist under current T ANF law for women who are 
experiencing or have experienced domestic violence. To ameliorate the 
effects ofTANF's child support cooperation provisions and other changes 
such as the time limits and work requirements for domestic violence 
victims, advocates against domestic violence and their supporters in 
Congress added a Family Violence Amendment to the Welfare Act just 
before it passed. When adopted by a state, the enacted Family Violence 
Option (FVO) requires a state's TANF agency to screen applicants for 
domestic violence and permits the agency to waive the child support 
cooperation requirement and other TANF requirements. A similar waiver, 
known as the "good cause waiver," was already available to all states under 
the former AFDC program and was amended under TANF. The existing 
good cause waiver permits a state child support agency to waive a mother's 
child support cooperation requirement if the agency finds good cause under 
federal and state guidelines. Along with other reasons, good cause may 
include domestic violence .. 
Under current federal law, implementation of both the FVO and good 
cause waiver is left largely to the respective state administrative agencies. 
Some research and anecdotal evidence has found that many of the states 
that are implementing these waivers have not done so in a manner that 
adequately reflects or protects the interests of survivors of domestic 
violence.9 Especially significant in this regard is many states' failure to use 
the new FVO as a way of waiving child support cooperation requirements 
for victims who might seek such an exemption and most states' failure to 
coordinate their FVO with their child support enforcement system's 
existing good cause waiver.lo In addition, many victims of domestic 
violence in many states remain unaware of either waiver, and women are 
not using the provisions in proportion to their anticipated need. 11 This 
8. See. e.g., Davis, supra note 4, at 23·25. 
9. See. e.g., Marcellene E. Hearn, Dangerous Indifference: New York City's Failure to 
Implement the Family Violence Option (2000), http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues 
Iwel/dangindif. pdf. 
10. See NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Family Violence Option: State-by-
State Summary (2002), http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/weIlFVO_statebystate.pdf 
(listing thirty-nine states that have formally adopted the FVO, with a total of twenty-four 
that have used the FVO explicitly to waive child support cooperation requirements). 
1 L JESSICA PEARSON ET AL., MASSACHUSETTS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE 
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conglomeration of barriers means that victims of domestic violence are 
currently not reaping the benefits that Congress intended in passing these 
federal laws. In effect, these federal waivers are not being fully 
implemented at the state level. 
In line with existing research, practice, and advocacy in the domestic 
violence and child support fields, this article demonstrates that in order for 
implementation of the federal child support waivers to occur for the full 
benefit of domestic violence survivors, states need to coordinate their FVO 
implementation with the existing child support good cause waiver and need 
to improve usage of both waivers to waive child support cooperation 
requirements for those victims who seek TANF. The article argues that 
advocates against domestic violence can play and have played a vital role 
at the state and local levels in ensuring that domestic violence survivors 
who are seeking access to child support and TANF know about the waivers 
and that administering agencies provide this information in an accessible 
manner. 12 The voices of state and local advocates against domestic 
violence - whether legal services providers, state coalitions, shelters, social 
services providers, researchers, or others - are essential to improving 
REFORM: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, FINAL REPORT iv, vii (2001) [hereinafter PEARSON ET AL., 
MASSACHUSETTS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE REFORM); Jessica Pearson et aI., 
Balancing Safety and Self-Sufficiency: Lessons on Serving Victims of Domestic Violence for 
Child Support and Public Assistance Agencies, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 176, 177-78 
(2001) [hereinafter Pearson et aI., Balancing Safety and Self-Sufficiency]; Jody Raphael, 
Prisoners of Abuse: Policy Implications of the Relationship Between Domestic Violence and 
Welfare Receipt, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186, 191 (1996); Vanessa Blum, Making D.C. 
Welfare System Work, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26,1999, at 2. 
12. Because TANF is up for reauthorization, advocates at the federal level have drafted 
federal legislation that is more favorable than current law to women who have experienced 
domestic or sexual violence. See Building Secure and Healthy Families Act of 2002, S. 
2876, 107th Congo §§ 5, 7 (2002) (introduced Aug. 1, 2002, by Sen. Patty Murray (D-
Wash.)) (among other amendments to the 1996 welfare law, requires states to certify how 
they will adequately inform individuals of program, requirements, confidentiality 
procedures, good cause exceptions, and waivers; requires states to certify how they will 
waive without time limit any program requirement that makes it more difficult for an 
individual to escape domestic violence; clarifies requirements for agency verification of 
domestic violence; requires agency caseworker training in the nature and dynamics of 
domestic violence; requires states to provide statistics on waivers granted under the 
program; and eliminates full-family sanctions). This bill has not been re-introduced in the 
Senate during the 108th Congress. 
The House of Representatives passed the Personal ResponBibility, Work, and Family 
Promotion Act, H.R. 4, 108th Congo (2003), in February 2003 by a vote of 230-192. 
National advocates against domestic violence have criticized the House legislation as 
failing, on multiple fronts, to meet the needs of battered women and their children. E.g .. 
Family Violence Prevention Fund, House Passes Welfare Reform, at http;llendabuse.org 
(Feb. 28, 2003). 
Because federal reauthorization legislation is pending and because state and local 
domestic violence legal and social services providers and advocates continue to assist 
victims of domestic violence with or without new federal legislation, this article focuses on 
the role of state and local advocates in preventing domestic violence through the existing 
child support system. 
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access to child support and T ANF for battered women and making access 
to these resources safe for them and their children. 
Part II of this article explains in more detail TANF's child support 
cooperation requirements and elaborates on the dangers that the law poses 
for survivors of domestic violence. The section also describes the federal 
Family Violence Option and child support good cause waivers. Part III 
describes how the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island 
are implementing the FVO and child support waivers and the role that 
advocates against domestic violence in these jurisdictions are playing in 
improving implementation. The article concludes by suggesting that state 
administrative agencies cooperate with state and local advocates against 
domestic violence as the agencies continue to implement their T ANF 
programs. 
II. CHILD SUPPORT WAIVERS UNDER TANF: FAMILY 
VIOLENCE OPTION AND GOOD CAUSE 
With the overarching goals of providing flexibility to states, reducing 
welfare caseloads, promoting marriage, and reducing out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies,13 the 1996 Welfare Act abolished the program of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), known as welfare, and 
replaced it with a program of block grants to the states, called Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Under the 1996 Welfare Act, 
states are permitted to establish a time limit for receipt of public assistance 
of up to five years of the life of an individua1.14 After two years of cash 
assistance, a recipient is required by law to work. IS In addition to time 
limits and the work requirement, as a condition of T ANF eligibility the law 
requires a single mother applying for T ANF to assign her right to child 
support to the state. 16 The law also requires her to cooperate with the state 
in identifying and locating the father of her children so that the state may 
pursue child support from him in her place. I? 
A. CHILD SUPPORT COOPERATION UNDER T ANF 
The TANF child support cooperation requirements partially resemble 
the previous cooperation requirements under AFDC. Under AFDC, a 
custodial parent was required to assign her right to collect child support to 
the state as a condition of eligibility (a significant majority of custodial 
parents on AFDC were women). The state relied on this assignment in 
pursuing its claim for child support from the non-custodial parent (most 
often the father). The assignment of this right to the state was designed to 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 60I(a)-(b) (2003). 
14. ld. § 608(a)(7). 
15. ld. § 602(a)(I)(A)(ii). 
16. ld. § 608(a)(3). 
17. ld. § 608(a)(2). 
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help the state recoup its provision of public assistance to the mother. A 
second eligibility requirement for the mother was cooperation with the state 
child support agency in locating the father, establishing paternity, and 
obtaining, modifying, and enforcing the support order as necessary. If a 
mother failed to cooperate, she would not receive her portion of the 
family's AFDC grant, and the AFDC payment would instead go to a third 
party on behalf of her children. ls Under AFDC, many states had "pass-
through" provisions that allowed a cooperating mother to retain a nominal 
amount of the child support (e.g., $50 in D.C.) as an incentive to cooperate 
with the state. 
More specifically for the AFDC applicant mother, the federal 
requirements meant that she had to do the following: (1) provide whatever 
information she had to the welfare agency or claim that she did not have 
any relevant information; (2) attend conferences at child support agencies; 
(3) subject herself and her child to any genetic testing for paternity that was 
ordered by the court or administrative agency; (4) appear at any court or 
administrative hearings; and (5) tum over to the state child support agency 
any payments that she received directly from the father. 19 Despite these 
relatively stringent requirements, in practice state weltare agencies did not 
always enforce all of these obligations if the mother said that she did not 
know the father's location.20 
Under TANF, child support enforcement requirements have become 
even more stringent, both statutorily and in practice. While under AFDC 
the state welfare agency made cooperation determinations along with many 
other determinations related to a recipient's receipt of public assistance, 
under T ANF the law vests the state child support agency - a discrete 
agency with a single-minded purpose - with this authority. The TANF 
agency remains the agency that is ultimately responsible for sanctioning the 
family if the child support agency establishes that the mother is not 
cooperating.21 In practice, to "cooperate" under TANF means that the 
mother makes a "good faith effort" to do the following: (1) provide the 
state with information about the father; (2) appear at interviews, hearings, 
and legal proceedings; and (3) subject herself and her child to genetic tests 
to establish paternity, ifnecessary.22 The minimum federal requirement for 
cooperation is that the mother provide the father's name and any other 
identifying information that the state deems appropriate; states are 
18. See Paula Roberts, Pursuing Child Support for Victims of Domestic Violence, in 
BATTERED WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM: THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 4, 
at 59,61. 
19. Id.at61-62. 
20. Vicki Turetsky, Implementing the Family Violence Option: Lessons From Child 
Support (1997), http://www.clasp.orgldms/documentsIl037123370.16/fvo.htm. 
21. Roberts, supra note 18, at 65; Susan Notar & Vicki Turetsky, Models for Safe Child 
Support Enforcement, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'y & L. 657, 677-78 (2000). 
22. Roberts, supra note 18, at 65. 
Winter 2003] BATTERED BY THE SYSTEM 53 
otherwise free to establish any additional standards about what information 
the mother is required to provide about the father.23 
Depending on the state, if a mother does not cooperate with the state, 
she may be sanctioned by partial or full loss of TANF benefits for herself 
and her entire family.24 In practice, very few states automatically deny 
eligibility for T ANF applicants if they fail to provide a specific piece of 
information about the father.25 However, most states mandate some form 
of penalty when non-cooperation' is established - ranging from the 
minimum, federally mandated 25% reduction of the entire family's 
benefits, to complete ineligibility for the whole family, with mixed forms 
of graduated sanctions in between in some states?6 Indeed, if the state 
TANF agency fails to enforce the child support agency's determination that 
the mother failed to cooperate, then the federal government must reduce the 
state's entire TANF funding by up to 5%.27 These aggressive federal 
provisions urge states to pass along their own compliance burden to the 
women who are forced to cooperate with the state agency as a result of 
their T ANF eligibility. 
B. DANGERS FOR MOTHERS WHO ARE EXPERlENCING OR HAVE 
EXPERIENCED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Research and practice both demonstrate that child support is often a 
vital economic resource for mothers who are experiencing or have 
experienced domestic violence at the hands of their children's father 
especially for mothers who are already economically vUlnerable. With 
public assistance an unreliable and temporary resource given federal time 
limits and work requirements, and low-wage jobs providing an incomplete 
part of the economic package for low-income families, child support is a 
major economic resource for a woman with children.28 For a victim of 
domestic violence who is just entering the T ANF program, child support is 
often a necessary component of the total resources that she seeks in her 
attempt to leave her abuser and survive without him.29 One study has 
shown that on average child support represents over a quarter of the family 
21 Id. 
24. Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 678-79. Under AFDC, only the individual 
mother was sanctioned for failure to cooperate. !d. at 679. 
25. Vicki Turetsky, State Child Support Cooperation and Good Cause: A Preliminary 
Look at State Policies (1998), http://www.c1asp.orglpubs/childsupportlcoopsum.htm. 
26. Id. 
27. 42 U.S.c. § 609(a)(5) (2003); Roberts, supra note 18, at 65-66. 
28. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 60 (relying on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1995) 
figures to demonstrate women's reliance on child support to supplement earnings); Deborah 
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, II YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 3, II (1999). 
29. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 60-61; Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 659 (noting 
that often battered women need child support after leaving their abuser since government 
aid is insecure). 
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budget for poor children who receive support, and that under ideal 
conditions, fully paid child support would contribute an additional average 
of just under $3,000 per year per family for families on public assistance 
that are headed by single mothers.3o In addition, for a woman who has 
experienced violence at the hands of her children's father, enforcing his 
child support obligation may have symbolic significance, representing his 
accountability to her and her children.31 Whatever the reason, significant 
proportions of TANF applicants who have experienct~d domestic violence 
say that they want to pursue child support from their children's father.32 
However, as advocates against domestic violence have argued and as 
research has demonstrated, mothers who have experienced domestic 
violence at the hands of their children's father often face particular risks in 
entering the child support system. These risks include informing the 
abusive father of the mother's location and enabling legal retaliation 
against the mother for pursuing support.33 Many battered women move 
. within their state or out of state to escape their abusers or stay in battered 
women's shelters; informing the batterer of a woman's location through 
mandated cooperation easily could thwart her efforts to escape the abuser.34 
Legal retaliation may include renewed litigation against the mother, leading 
to custody or visitation awards for the father that would put the mother and 
her children at risk.35 Increased contact with the filther could result in 
30. See Pearson et aL, Balancing Safety and Self-Sufficiency, supra note II, at 185 (citing 
K. Witkowski & R. Murthy, How Much Can Child Support Provide? Welfare, Family 
Income and Child Support (1999»; Vicki Turetsky, What If Ali the Child Support Money 
Came Home?, 5 PUB. INT. L. REP. 13,15 (2000). 
31. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 60; Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 664 (noting 
victims' reluctance to allow abusers to escape financial responsibility). 
32. About 50% of battered welfare applicants in Massachusetts (who disclosed domestic 
abuse and foresaw future abuse), 65% of battered welfare applicants in Minnesota, and 93% 
of battered welfare applicants in Colorado wanted to pursue child support, according to 
research presented at the October 2001 Trapped By Povertyrrrapped by Abuse Conference 
at the University of Michigan School of Social Work. Jessica Pearson et aI., Abstract, New 
Approaches to Self-Sufficiency and Safety in Public Assistance and Child Support Agencies: 
Preliminary Findings from Three Demonstration Projects, at http://www.ssw.umich.edu 
Itrappedlconference.html (2001); see also Ruth A. Brandwein, Family Violence and Social 
Policy: Welfare "Reform" and Beyond, in BAITERED WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND WELFARE 
REFORM: THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 4, at 147, ISS, 162-63 (noting that many abused 
women want the child's father held financially responsible). 
33. JODY RAPHAEL & RICHARD TOLMAN, TRAPPED BY POVERTY TRAPPED BY ABUSE: NEW 
EVIDENCE DOCUMENTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE 
37 (1997), available at http://www.ssw.umich.edultrappedlpubs_trapped.pdf; Wendy 
Pollack, Twice Victimized: Domestic Violence and Welfare "Rejbrm, " 30 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REv. 329, 338 (1996). 
34. Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 659; see also Davis, supra note 4, at 23-24 
(noting that in some instances abused women will forgo seeking child support to avoid 
contact with their abuser); Lein et aI., supra note I, at 201-04. 
35. See RAPHAEL & TOLMAN, supra note 33, at 37; Imperial, supra note 2, at 20 (citing 
results of focus group discussion with domestic violence shelter residents about TANF 
paternity establishment and child support cooperation requirements). 
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renewed violence against the mother in courtroom proceedings, visitation, 
or other court-ordered arrangements.36 Non-custodial abusers often also 
threaten their children's mother with violence against the children or with 
child kidnapping.37 
In the context of a relationship where domestic abuse is or has been 
present, providing an abusive man with information about the location of 
his former partner and giving him an opportunity to contact her or retaliate 
against her in a legal setting ignores the dynamics of power and control that 
are at the center of patterns of domestic violence. The power and control 
theory of domestic violence explains that the use of violence in an intimate 
relationship is always a choice. In many parts of the U.S. today one still 
can make the choice to resort to abuse to meet one's needs with little or no 
consequences.38 Perpetrators of domestic violence use patterns of physical 
and/or sexual violence, isolation, intimidation, threats, and emotional and 
economic abuse to gain power and contro1.39 Scholars have compared the 
psychological trauma that survivors of extended domestic violence 
experience to the experience of war veterans and prisoners of war.40 
Batterers often successfully externalize blame for the abuse onto the 
victim.41 Violence usually escalates once it has occurred and often 
becomes more severe and more frequent as it is repeated.42 
Retaliation in the context of domestic violence also may include forms 
of "financial warfare" against a mother who pursues a divorce or child 
support action - for example, withdrawing all funds from a joint bank 
account or prolonging divorce or custody litigation to drain her of financial 
resources if she is not already financially exhausted.43 Abusive fathers with 
outstanding child support enforcement orders typically are subject to 
garnishment of wages, tax intercepts, and attachment of unemployment and 
workers compensation benefits, among other collection mechanisms. 
Regardless of their success, these procedures may provoke an abuser's rage 
against the mother,44 which could lead to any number of irrational, 
unpredictably violent behaviors against her if the abuser knows where she 
IS. Perhaps most critically, stringent paternity establishment and 
36. Jessica Pearson et aI., Child Support and Domestic Violence: The Victims Speak Out, 
5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 427, 428 (1999). See generally RAPHAEL & TOLMAN, supra 
note 33. 
37. Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 659. 
38. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 28, at 39-44. 
39. Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, Power and Control Wheel, at 
http://www.mpdi.ipharos.comldocumentsfPhyVio.pdf(last visited May 1,2003). 
40. Leni Marin, identifying Battered immigrant Women, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 
IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE COMMUNITIES: ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF BATTERED WOMEN 1, 9 
(Deeana L. Jang et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997); Epstein, supra note 28, at 40-41. 
41. Marin, supra note 40, at 9. 
42. id. at 11; Epstein, supra note 28, at 7. 
43. Davis, supra note 4, at 24. 
44. Pearson et aI., supra note 36, at 428-29. 
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cooperation requirements restrict a woman's ability to rely on her own 
knowledge of the likelihood of future violence and manipulation in making 
decisions about whether or not to pursue child support.45 
C. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS TO THE CHILD SUPPORT COOPERATION 
REQUIREMENT 
Under current federal law, two exceptions exist on which victims of 
domestic violence and their ad~ocates may rely in seeking exemption from 
TANF's paternity establishment and child support cooperation 
requirements. The first and more established system is the waiver for good 
cause that the state T ANF agency may provide to domestic violence 
victims if victims disclose violence. Depending on the state, good cause 
reasons often are not restricted to the experience of domestic violence and 
may include many other limiting circumstances, including those that 
constituted the now-repealed federal definition of good cause under AFDC. 
As implemented by various states under TANF, these broader reasons for a 
good cause exception often include: (1) reasonably anticipated physical or 
emotional harm to the mother or child; (2) conception of the child through 
forcible rape or incest; (3) pending adoption proceedings involving the 
child; or (4) the mother's cooperation with the social worker in a 
determination as to whether the child ought to be placed for adoption.46 
The second and newer waiver system is the Family Violence Option that 
was enacted for the first time in 1996 as part of the Wdfare Act. For those 
states that adopt it, the FVO permits the state to waive child support 
cooperation requirements among the other T ANF requirements such as 
work and time limits ifthe state finds good cause.47 
1. Waiver for Good Cause 
Under the previous AFDC system, before n:qumng a mother's 
cooperation with child support enforcement the AFDC caseworker was 
supposed to provide written notice to the mother about the good cause 
exception. The federally prescribed notice was required to contain an 
explanation of the cooperation requirement. for AFDC eligibility, the kind 
of information that was required for the mother to make a claim for good 
cause, that the standard for evaluating a mother's good cause claim was 
'.'the best interests of the child," and that if she was not granted a good 
cause waiver, the mother would be required to cooperate or else lose part of 
her AFDC grant. In practice, however, AFDC workers typically provided 
the written notice without providing any verbal explanation of the waiver, 
45. Davis, supra note 4, at 27; Patricia Cole & Sarah M. Buel, Safety and Financial 
Security for Battered Women: Necessary Steps for Transitioning from Welfare to Work, 7 
GBO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 307, 325-26 (2000). 
46. Roberts, supra note 18, at 62 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 232.40 (1996)). 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2003); Roberts, supra note 18, at 66. 
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so the possibility of obtaining a good cause exemption was lost in the 
shuffle of paperwork accompanying the mother's application for benefits.48 
This lack of notice may explain why so few good cause waivers were 
granted under the previous system, despite the high number of domestic 
violence cases among mothers who were receiving public assistance.49 
Another likely explanation is that mothers who feared retaliation at the 
hands of their children's father may simply have signed the permitted 
attestation saying that they did not have any information on the father's 
whereabouts. 50 
Unlike AFDC, the T ANF statute provides no definition of good cause 
or standards for evaluating good cause claims. Rather, states are free to 
adopt their own definitions and standards of proof, so long as the "best 
interests of the child" govern the definition. States are also permitted to 
adopt their own additional exceptions to cooperation. Indeed, federal law 
currently provides no requirements for notice either about good cause or 
about cooperation; no requirements for standards governing the evaluation 
of claims other than the general best interests of the child; no standards of 
proof for waiver applicants; and no guidance on how a state should 
coordinate the TANF agency's good cause determination with the child 
support agency's cooperation determination.51 Thus states were left to 
interpret all of these procedures when developing their T ANF 
implementation plans.52 
2. Waiver Under the Family Violence Option 
States may rely on the federal Family Violence Option in developing 
their respective TANF implementation plans. The FVO permits states to 
screen TANF cases for domestic violence, safeguard battered applicants' 
confidentiality, and refer battered individuals to counseling and supportive 
services. States may also use the FVO to waive other TANF requirements 
such as residency requirements, child support cooperation, time limits, 
work requirements, and family cap provisions if they make good cause 
determinations to do SO.53 A state may apply the FVO waiver where it 
determines that requiring individuals to comply with any of the T ANF 
requirements "would make it more difficult for individuals receiving 
assistance [under T ANF] to escape domestic violence or unfairly penalize 
such individuals who are or have been victimized by such violence, or 
individuals 'who are at risk of further domestic violence.,,54 A majority of 
4S. Roberts, supra note IS, at 62-63. 
49. /d. at 63-64. 
50. /d. at 64. 
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(I)(A)(ii), 602(a)(7), 60S(a)(2)-(3), 609(a)(5) (2003); Roberts, 
supra note IS, at 65-66. 
52. See Roberts, supra note IS, at 66. 
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2003); Roberts, supra note IS, at 66. 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2003). 
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states (thirty-nine) and D.C. have implemented the FVO, although fewer 
states (twenty-four) have used it to waive the child support cooperation 
requirements. 55 States are continuing to implement their TANF and FVO 
programs, the substance of which may vary dramatically from state to state. 
D. LIMITED INTERACTION OF THE Two SYSTEMS TO PREVENT DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 
In those states that have used the FVO to waive TANF child support 
cooperation requirements,56 researchers and advocates have noted states' 
limited integration of the FVO provisions related to child support 
enforcement with the existing, albeit significantly amended, good cause 
waiver.57 First, from the perspective of those who have researched state 
child support changes under T ANF, several systemic barriers have 
emerged. Many child support agencies integrating their existing good 
cause procedures with the new FVO waiver may face barriers that hinder 
their ability to manage domestic violence cases in a manner that advocates 
against domestic violence are likely to find adequate. For example, as 
emerging research and practice suggest, if the child support agency alone 
manages the child support waiver portion of FVO implementation in 
conjunction with its existing good cause process, as in New Jersey, there 
may be no guarantee that women will be assessed by a caseworker trained 
in the dynamics of domestic violence, and information obtained by the 
T ANF agency that is relevant to a good cause determination may not reach 
the child support agency.58 More generally, the individualized screening 
and casework that domestic violence cases oft(:n require may be 
incompatible with current trends in the child suppOI1. enforcement system 
towards greater automation and decreased attention among child support 
workers to individual cases due largely to huge case loads and backlogs in 
the system. 59 Any approach to integration that seeks to involve the child 
support system will face these issues. 
However, if the TANF agency alone becomes the central location for 
managing not only FVO procedures but also child support good cause 
screening for domestic violence, as has occurred in Kansas, then women 
seeking child support who are not on TANF (whether because they are 
55. NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 10; Jody Raphael & Sheila 
Haennicke, Keeping Battered Women Safe through the Welfare-to-Work Journey: How Are 
We Doing? A Report on the Implementation of the Policies for Battered Women in State 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Programs, Final Report (1999), 
hnp:/Iwww.ssw.umich.edu/trappedipubsJvoI999.pdf. 
56. See NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 10 (listing twenty-four 
states that are using the FVO to waive child support cooperation requirements). 
57. See Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 684-85 (discussing the difficulties of keeping 
the old standards and adopting the new standards); Raphael & Haennicke, supra note 55, at 
16. 
58. Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 687-88. 
59. Turetsky, supra note 20. 
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former TANF clients or simply ineligible) may not learn about the potential 
dangers and advantages of becoming or remaining involved in the child 
support enforcement system. 60 In addition, workers and administrators in 
the child support agency itself may not have the opportunity to learn about 
the issues facing domestic violence victims.61 Indeed, most state FVO 
procedures administered by TANF agencies that researchers have 
examined do not include any discussion of the potential dangers or 
advantages of paternity establishment and child support enforcement.62 
More generally, TANF agencies administering the FVO may be doing so in 
a limited manner overall, as critics from women's rights organizations, 
legal services organizations, and the research community have suggested 
specifically in New York City and Texas63 - never mind paying special 
attention to the child support issue. 
In addition to specific problems with FVO implementation, many 
welfare departments have an unfortunate history of lack of attention to the 
problems that battered women face in gaining access to benefits or 
employment a history that is not new under TANF.64 Agencies' 
historical lack of attention to or training in the dynamics of domestic 
violence may mean that victims are too suspicious ofthe agency to disclose 
abuse, which is required to get an FVO waiver, and that once they disclose 
abuse the case worker may handle the situation in a manner that could be 
harmful to the woman.65 According to advocates in the domestic violence 
movement and child support researchers, many child support agencies 
share a similar history with regard to use, or lack thereof, of the older good 
cause waiver for domestic violence victims.66 
Under both a child support~centered and a TANF -centered model, 
abuse victims may face specific dangers in cooperating with the child 
support system. Nonetheless, support payments remain a major economic 
resource for battered women, a point on which there is little disagreement 
among advocates and researchers in the domestic violence, welfare, and 
60. Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 686-87. 
61. [d. 
62. See Raphael & Haennicke, supra note 55, at 15-16. 
63. See Lein, supra note 1, at 203-04 (describing and analyzing FVO procedures used by 
Texas TANF agency); Hearn, supra note 9 (joint project of NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund; Legal Aid Society of New York, Civil Division; Women, Welfare and 
Abuse Task Force; and Urban Justice Center). 
64. See Cole & Buel, supra note 45, at 320; Wendy Pollack & Martha F. Davis, The 
Family Violence Option of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996: Interpretation and Implementation, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 
1079, 1083-84 (1997) (describing the legislative history of the FVO). 
65. See Cole & Bue!, supra note 45, at 320. 
66. See JILL DAVIES, THE NEW WELFARE LAW: CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 3 (1997); 
Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 658-59; Pollack, supra note 33, at 337; Raphael, supra 
note 11, at 192-93; Jessica Pearson & Esther Ann Griswold, Child Support Policies and 
Domestic Violence, PUBLIC WELFARE, Winter 1997, at 26,27. 
60 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
child support communities.67 For this reason, states should take women's 
safety seriously not only by giving notice of and granting waivers to 
victims who seek them, but also by making child support a safely available 
resource for those victims who choose to pursue it despite their experience 
of abuse in the relationship. For example, researchers have identified and 
described a range of "yellow light" procedures that are designed to address 
some of the safety issues raised by automated child support enforcement 
that some states are pursuing.68 The challenge remains, however, for most 
state and local administrative agencies to, fully integrate domestic violence 
prevention into their child support enforcement systems pursuant to 
existing federal and state legislation and regulations. Some successful 
integration efforts appear to be developing. 
III. INTEGRATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION 
INTO TANF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: ADVOCACY 
AND ADMINISTRATION IN RHODE ISLAND, 
MASSACHUSETTS, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
A few jurisdictions, including Rhode Island,' Massachusetts, and the 
District of Columbia, have made progress on improving integration 
between child support enforcement efforts and domestic violence screening 
under the FVO and TANF.69 These jurisdictions, or advocates within them, 
continue to seek stronger implementation of domestic violence protections 
for women seeking child support. It may be no coincidence that these 
programs have directly involved advocates or coalitions against domestic 
violence in their implementation processes - whether at the initiative of 
advocates themselves (as in D.C.) or at the initiative of the federal or state 
agency (as in Massachusetts and Rhode Island). This section provides an 
overview of these three programs with an emphasis on the response, 
involvement, and criticisms of advocates against domestic violence in each 
of these jurisdictions. 
A. RHODE ISLAND 
Under its Family Violence Option Advocacy Program, initiated in 1998 
by a grant from the state Department of Human Services to the Rhode 
Island 'Coalition Against Domestic Violence (Coalition), Rhode Island 
contracted with the Coalition to administer its FVO.7o The Coalition then 
67, See Cole & Buel, supra note 45, at 324 (indicating that many women who were either 
working or on welfare relied on support payments from the father of their children); Epstein, 
supra note 28, at II; see also supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
68. See Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 692-94, 712-13. 
69. A comprehensive review of all jurisdictions that may be sw;cessfully integrating child 
support enforcement with domestic violence prevention under the TANF Family Violence 
Option is beyond the scope of this paper. 
70. Raphael & Haennicke, supra note 55, at 29, app. B, Rhode Island (describing the 
Rhode Island program); see also R.t GEN. LAWS § 40-5.1-46 (2001) (Rhode Island's FVO 
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sub-contracted with one of its member agencies, the Women's Center of 
Rhode Island, a domestic violence shelter and service provider, to carry out 
assessments, counseling, safety planning, lay court advocacy, and other 
services.7! Since its inception, the'program has served nearly 800 battered 
women in the state.72 All state TANF offices73 and, more recently, all state 
child support offices,74 refer cases to the project. The state T ANF agency 
has developed a consolidated written notice to recipients that provides 
information about recipients' ability to waive child support cooperation 
requirements both under the FVO and under the good cause waiver, and the 
notice explains the procedures for applying for the exemptions,7s If a 
T ANF client expresses concern with meeting the child support cooperation 
and other TANF requirements because of domestic violence, an eligibility 
technician at the state agency either relies on the existing child support 
good cause procedure to assist the woman or refers her to the Women's 
Center's FVO advocacy program. 76 , If a TANF client is referred to the 
Women's Center's advocacy program, the Center's caseworkers offer the 
client relief under either the good cause procedure or the FVO; the Center's 
assistance in the form of comprehensive support services is the same under 
either procedure.77 According· to one woman who· used a Rhode Island 
FVO waiver and the Center's services, "It got me through the winter 
financially and emotionally because my children were having a difficult 
time and I had to physically be there for them.,,78 
According to the Coalition, advantages of the program include the 
knowledge and experience that staff at the Women's Center have in 
working with victims of domestic violence, as well as improved 
communication with the Department of Human Services and access to 
statute, which exempts child support cooperation in addition to work, residency, and time 
limits, and adopts the optional federal FVO standard); NOW Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, supra note 10. 
71. See Raphael & Haennicke, supra note 55, at 29; Rhode Island Coalition Against 
Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence & FVO. Comments to u.s. Department of Health 
and Human Services 'on TANF Reauthorization (Nov. 30, 2001) (on file with author) 
(describing Rhode Island's FVO program); Telephone Interview with Patricia Loomis, 
Policy and Research Associate, Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence (Jan. 4, 
2002). Legal services organizations in the state have not been involved in the court 
advocacy portion of the program. See E-mail from Patricia Loomis, Policy and Research 
Associate, Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence to Naomi Stern (Nov. 29~ 
2001) (on file with author). 
72. See Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 71. 
73. See id. 
74. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Santilli, Chief Legal Counsel, Rhode Island 
Department of Child Support Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2002). 
75. Raphael & Haennicke, supra note 55, at 16. 
76. See E-mail from Patricia Loomis, Policy and Research Associate, Rhode Island 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, to Naomi Stern (Feb. 6,2003) (on file with author). 
77. See id. 
78. Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 71 (quoting a 
domestic violence victim who used the FVO program and services). 
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some of that agency's resources.79 Under the grant, the Coalition meets 
monthly with the agency and has developed a close working relationship 
with agency officials.80 Agency staff have facilitated communication with 
the advocates and have assisted them with gaining access to resources at 
the T ANF office that have been helpful in working with victim clients, 
such as separate interview rooms and meeting space.8 ) 
More recently under the program, the Coalition has conducted joint 
trainings with the child support staff about the Women's Center program 
and has developed a strong relationship with the child support enforcement 
office.82 For example, when advocates expressed concern about the court 
system's lack of confidentiality procedures in support cases involving 
violence, the head of the child support agency stepped-in to ensure that the 
court developed a victim confidentiality policy, including the placement of 
a family violence indicator on all child support case files involving 
violence, a measure that is comparable to the family violence indicator 
placed on TANF case files involving violence.83 In addition, child support 
eligibility technicians and T ANF caseworkers recently received a three-
and-a-half-hour cross-training on the nature and dynamics of domestic 
violence, FVO procedures, and clarification of the child support good cause 
procedure. 84 Further trainings are being planned for the clerical staff and 
interpreter staff.85 
The Coalition also has noted some continued barriers to fully 
implementing its program. The Coalition remains concerned that not all 
T ANF recipients in the state actually receive information about the 
Women's Center, about waivers and other protections that are available for 
work and child support requirements, or about services to which victims 
can gain access.86 Still needed are outreach to all communities in the state 
to ensure equal access to services, development of domestic violence 
services for families receiving non-cash assistance such as Medicaid and 
Food Stamps, and ongoing program evaluation.8? While direct 
communication between advocates and the TANF and child support 
agencies has proven successful, the coalition has noted that more direct 
coordination is needed between the two agencies.88 From the perspective 
of the child support agency, the greatest obstacles to improving this 
communication are the necessary computer system changes that are under 
79. See Telephone Interview with Patricia Loomis, supra note 71. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. 
83. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Sharon Santilli, supra note 74. 
84. See E-mail from Patricia Loomis, supra note 76. 
85. See id. 
86. See Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 71. 
87. See id. 
88. See Telephone Interview with Patricia Loomis, supra note 71. 
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development in the agency.89 
B. MASSACHUSETTS 
As a result of research and demonstration funding awarded to the 
Massachusetts Child Support Enforcement Office in September 1997 by 
the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement, together with continued 
state funding and support since the termination of the federal demonstration 
project, Massachusetts has been the focus of recent research and 
programming on the connections between domestic violence, child support, 
and implementation of the 1996 Welfare Act. 90 As described in the 
evaluation that was funded under the federal grant, the initial federal 
demonstration effort was designed to improve the state's child support 
enforcement rates and, simultaneously, to understand and address the needs 
of domestic violence victims in the child support and TANF systems.9! In 
response to the 1996 Welfare Act, Massachusetts adopted the federal FVO 
with respect to the new work requirement, time limit, and family cap 
provisions.92 Apart from the child support demonstration grant, the state 
also received a federal grant to conduct cross-agency training on domestic 
violence for caseworkers, which the state used to help implement TANF 
and the FVO.93 With the demonstration funding, Massachusetts hired four 
domestic violence specialists who were placed at TANF agency locations, 
in line with findings from the Governor's Commission on Domestic 
Violence, to provide direct services to applicants who were experiencing 
domestic violenc~ and to assist regular agency caseworkers as resources on 
the issue.94 The child support agency hired an attorney to specialize in 
domestic violence issues in that agency.95 
As the evaluation suggests, the Massachusetts model demonstrates the 
state's strong commitment to addressing the issue of domestic violence in 
its TANF and child support systems. By enabling the state's domestic 
violence specialists to assist victims, both the T ANF and child support 
agencies view themselves as prioritizing victim safety.96 Significant 
cooperation between the state TANF and child support agencies has arisen 
as a combined result of ongoing efforts by advocates against domestic 
violence, the state's commitment to the issue, and the funding that enabled 
89. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Santilli, supra note 74. 
90. See JESSICA PEARSON ET AL., MASSACHUSETTS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE 
REFORM, supra note 11, at 2, 87. 
91. Jd. at 2. 
92. fd. at II. 
93. Jd. 
94. Jd. at 15. 
95. See id. at 90. 
96. See JESSICA PEARSON ET At., MASSACHUSETTS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE 
REFORM, supra note 11, at 88-90. 
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the demonstration program and subsequent continuation efforts.97 
A salient finding of the Massachusetts evaluation is the interest that an 
unexpected number of victims expressed in pursuing child support from an 
abusive former partner, despite the history of abuse that victims and their 
children may have suffered at the abusers' hands.98 The evaluation 
distinguished between the victims who had experienced violence within the 
past twelve months or currently feared harm - who expressed serious 
concerns with pursuing child support - and victims with more distant 
violence who wanted to pursue child support.99 Although the evaluation 
concludes that applicants who do seek child support waivers "should be 
accorded both help with the application process and prompt and 
sympathetic action,"lOo this conclusion is secondary to the conclusion that 
since most victims want child support, agencies must develop protocols to 
ensure safety during the process. A potential danger of such a conclusion 
is that victims of domestic violence and agencies are encouraged to define 
victims' experiences of abuse narrowly as a result ofTANF's limitations at 
the federal level. 
C. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
Similarly to Rhode Island and Massachusetts, advocates in the District 
of Columbia have been directly involved in implementation of the FVO 
and improvement of child support policies to the benefit of D.C. victims. 
However, in practice the District's system is more complicated than the 
other jurisdictions' because D.C. maintains different waiver systems for 
T ANF work requirements (FVO) and child support cooperation 
requirements (good cause). Under the District's FVO, TANF recipients 
experiencing domestic violence are exempt only from T ANF work 
requirements, not child support cooperation. WI 
As part of the T ANF preliminary intake process, caseworkers in the 
Department of Human Services ask each T ANF applicant to identify 
barriers to employment, including domestic violence. If the application 
discloses domestic violence, the applicant is informed of the FVO 
waiver. 102 Caseworkers also give T ANF applicants notice informing them 
of child support cooperation requirements and their right to a good cause 
exemption. 103 In the past, if applicants sought a FVO exemption to the 
work requirements they were referred by contract to Women Empowered 
97. Id. at 88. 
98. Id. at vii, 101. 
99. /d. at 10 1-02. 
100. Id. at 109. 
101. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 4-205. 19(b)(2003). 
102. See Raphael & Haennicke, supra note 55, at app. B, District of Columbia (describing 
D.C.'s FVO program). 
103. See id.; Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, Esq., Managing Attorney, 
Women Empowered Against Violence (Nov. 21,200 I). 
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Against Violence (WEAVE), a local domestic violence legal and social 
services provider, for a screening interview and in-depth assessment. After 
conducting the screening and assessment, WEAVE would contact the 
T ANF agency in writing to request a work exemption or modification. \04 
Recently, another agency replaced WEAVE as the Department's FVO 
contractor. Although the subsequent contractor, EFFORTS, Inc., has a 
domestic violence social services program, the organization focuses 
primarily on the prevention and treatment of substance abuse. I05 
The District has not incorporated child support cooperation 
requirements into its FVO and relies solely on the existing good cause 
waiver to exempt victims from cooperation requirements. For this reason, 
legal advocates against domestic violence have worked in conjunction with 
the child support and TANF agencies to develop special protocols for 
handling domestic violence cases in the child support system in response to 
the federal T ANF changes. \06 When applicants apply for TANF, part of 
their interview includes written and oral notice of the good cause waiver. 
If a T ANF applicant requests a good cause waiver, the Department of 
Human Services (DHS) sends this information to the Child Support 
Enforcement Division (CSED). \07 If CSED grants a good cause waiver for 
domestic violence reasons, then, as iIi Rhode Island and Massachusetts, a 
family violence flag is placed on the woman's child support case file. \08 
Without such an indicator, CSED initiates its automated paternity 
establishment and child support enforcement process on behalf of the 
woman's children. \09 
D.C. advocates against domestic violence were actively involved both 
in furnishing DHS with early drafts of implementing regulations for the 
FVO and in monitoring the city's compliance with the regulations. llo In 
fact, DHS used some of the advocates' original language verbatim in the 
final regulations. III Domestic violence legal services attorneys made 
presentations to DHS on the issue, briefed the mayor's transition team, and 
trained other D.C. attorneys on the FVO.112 Partly as a result of their work, 
advocates were invited to participate in the city's FVO working group, 
otherwise composed solely of CSED, DHS, and court officials. 113 
104. See Raphael & Haennicke, supra note 55, at app. B, District of Columbia. 
105. See Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, Esq., Director of Legal Services, 
Women Empowered Against Violence (Feb. 17,2003). 
106. See Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, supra note 105. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
110. See Blum, supra note 11, at 2; Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, supra note 
105. 
Ill. See Blum, supra note 11, at 2; Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, supra note 
105. 
112. See Blum, supra note 11, at 2. 
113. See Blum, supra note 11, at 2; Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, supra note 
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Advocates also urged the D.C. Superior Court to adopt confidentiality 
procedures for child support cases involving domestic: violence; as a result, 
the court recently issued an administrative order to address this issue. I 14 
Because of advocates' pressure, the city sped up its implementation 
process. I 15 Similarly to the Rhode Island and Massachusetts programs, 
other advantages of advocates' involvement include the substantive 
knowledge and training that advocates bring to program implementation 
and improved communication between advocates and the agencies. I 16 
However, advocates have also noted room for improvement. Although 
DHS provides notice of both the FVO and the child support good cause 
waiver to victims, and although advocates tried their best to simplify the 
language for both of these waivers, the official notice that T ANF applicants 
receive was the result of a compromise with the agency and is still about 
six pages long, in fine print, and in language that is difficult to 
understand. 1l7 The notice is not translated into languages other than 
English.118 Advocates are currently working to improve the good cause 
notice. 119 Advocates are also concerned that disproportionately few T ANF 
recipients have applied for FVO exemption despite the fact that about 20% 
of women welfare recipients experience domestic violence. 12o 
D. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ADVOCATES' INVOLVEMENT 
As discussed by researchers and ,as seems clear from advocates' 
experiences, there are distinct advantages to an PVO implementation 
approach that delegates significant responsibility to advocates in the 
domestic violence community (whether intentionally or by default). In 
sum, these advantages include the following: Comprehensive services for 
victims; the provision of services by those with thorough experience in the 
dynamics of domestic violence; the likelihood that women will receive 
better infonnation and advice than they could expel;t from the T ANF or 
child support agencies alone; the need for less training for agency staff; and 
perhaps greater confidence on the part of the agency that the state is 
handling implementation, competently .121 As activists, domestic violence 
advocates can put the necessary pressure on agencies that otherwise may 
drag their feet on particular issues or remain unawarl~ of them altogether 
105. 
114. See Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, supra note 105. 
115. See Blum, supra note II, at 2. 
116. See Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, supra note 105. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. See Blum, supra note II, at 2; Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, supra note 
105. 
121. See Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 689 (discussing advantages of an "advocate 
contract model" in child support enforcement). 
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whether issuance of the FVO implementing regulation itself, as in D.C., or 
establishment of new confidentiality procedures in the court system, as in 
all of the above. jurisdictions. As practitioners with a specialized 
knowledge base, advocates also may be appreciated and respected by the 
agencies for their background and may be included in dialogues with the 
agencies, resulting in better long-term communication for both parties. 
Disadvantages also abound, particularly in a system such as the 
District's, where advocates pushed the agencies to implement the FVO of 
their own motivation. Dealing day-to-day with an unresponsive and 
bureaucratic system that has a long history of inattention to the barriers 
faced by domestic violence survivors eventually can result in advocates' 
disengagement from the reform process. 122 With sufficient resources 
however, as in Massachusetts and Rhode Island - where the child support 
or TANF agencies themselves sought advocates' input and have provided 
advocates with the funding to remain involved in a meaningful way -
advocates' experience may be notably different. But even in Rhode Island, 
without adequate funding the already strained resources of the Women's 
Center would be stretched even further since the Center works with its 
clients on many domestic violence issues other than the FVO. 123 
In addition to the strain on limited local resources, information on the 
child support process and good cause waiver may slip through the cracks in 
jurisdictions focused only on advocacy around the FVO. In Rhode Island, 
the domestic violence resources in the state are focused on the FVO and 
child support concerns within TANF, but not on the relevance of the good 
cause waiver for all other women who may be eligible for child support. In 
D.C., the city has not even fully integrated the two processes, and again, 
the focus of domestic violence advocates has been more on the FVO and 
less on the good cause waiver. Massachusetts has been successful in 
negotiating cooperation between the TANF and child support agencies; 
unlike Rhode Island and D.C., however, which have relied on service 
providers to conduct screenings, the Massachusetts agencies are not 
equipped to deal comprehensively with the full range of issues that victims 
face beyond child support and TANF. Finally, advocates or specialists in 
all cases may be caught in a middle position between their clients and the 
agencies from which they are receiving funding or contract authority (as in 
D.C. and Rhode Island) or employment (as in Massachusetts). 124 Such an 
arrangement may threaten advocates' loyalty to their individual clients or 
may encourage advocates to avoid systemic reform efforts altogether. 
122. See Telephone Interview with Susana SaCouto, supra note 105. 
123. See Telephone Interview with Patricia Loomis, supra note 71. 
124. See Notar & Turetsky, supra note 21, at 689. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
It may be no coincidence that some of the jurisdictions where 
advocates against domestic violence seem partially pleased with victims' 
access to the FVO or good cause waivers have involved many of these 
same domestic violence advocates in the process of implementation. Given 
the advantages and disadvantages of FVO and good cause implementation 
in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and D.C., it appears that battered women 
with child support issues are safer under TANF, at least temporarily, in 
jurisdictions where advocates have been so involved. While these 
jurisdictional models have their share of drawbacks, these examples 
represent some preliminary successes on behalf of battered women and 
their advocates in TANF and child support implementation. Even in these 
examples, not only do state and local administrative agency staff need 
ongoing and competent cross-training in the nature and dynamics of 
domestic violence and the importance of measures such as the FVO, the 
good cause waiver, and "yellow light" safety options, but agencies need to 
communicate better with each other regarding domestic violence 
prevention in the bureaucratic TANF and child support enforcement 
systems. 
In order to continue any of these working models and in order to 
develop additional improvements, continued and increased funding will be 
needed, both at the state and federal levels, to ensure that battered women 
do not fall through the gaps in what remains of our country's social safety 
net. Ongoing research and data collection are needed to ensure that 
advocates know what other states are doing, what is working to the 
advantage of battered women, and what has failed. 
Given the current political environment, particularly at the federal 
level, it is important to remember that state and local advocates and 
agencies can and must continue to play a vital role in implementing 
existing legislation to the advantage of battered women, despite limited 
resources and other constraints. Indeed, many of the problems that state 
and local advocates now face in the child support system existed before 
TANF and were not addressed by state agencies under AFDC either. In 
other words, regardless of shifting changes in federal legislation, state and 
local agencies - and the advocates that push them - have had, and still 
have, plenty to do to help domestic violence victims. 
Nonetheless, although state and local coalitions against domestic 
violence, domestic violence legal services providers, and other advocates 
and service providers can play important roles, particularly in 
communicating about the substance of new laws and regulations, their 
influence will be limited as long as educational and systemic barriers 
remain at the state and federal level. The best solution - a continuous, 
federal one - would require states to cooperate with domestic violence 
service providers, as in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, in implementing 
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programs that effect survivors of domestic violence and would provide the 
necessary federal funding and other resources for them to do so. In the 
long run, patchwork protections for battered women and their children do 
not keep them safe. 

